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Abstract 
The role of national parliaments in scrutinizing their governments in European 
Union affairs has been at the forefront of debates on democratic accountability 
in the EU for the past decade. Resolutions are the legislative instruments most 
clearly associated with government control. This article finds that party political 
strategies, and especially the different constraints and incentives for 
mainstream/government parties and issue entrepreneurs on Europe, are the 
most important factors determining the activity of national parliaments in the 
form of resolutions on EU affairs. Issue Entrepreneurs are parties which are 
Eurosceptic and for which Europe is salient. Motions initiated by issue 
entrepreneurs are numerous but limited to criticizing the government and 
contain little technical detail, while the resolutions of mainstream government 
parties mostly support the government’s position. Resolutions and motions in 
EU affairs are thus rather used as an instrument of ‘position taking’ than as a 
form of government control, but could still help to foster accountability by 
bringing EU issues and government policy to the citizens’ attention.  
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Introduction 
 
 Can national parliaments help to solve the accountability deficit in the 
European Union? Besides plenary debates and oral and written questions, 
resolutions are the most important tool of parliaments in European Union (EU) 
affairs, and they are seen as the instrument most clearly targeted at government 
control. This form activity is especially pertinent given that the transfer of 
powers from the national to the European level has weakened the power of 
national parliaments. This process is termed ‘de-parliamentarisation’ (Maurer 
and Wessels, 2001; Moravcsik, 1994). Analysing the factors driving 
parliamentary activity in the form of resolutions on EU affairs is an important 
step in the evaluation of the overall contribution of national parliaments to 
democratic accountability in the EU. 
 The main argument of this article is that party political strategies, and 
especially the different constraints and incentives for mainstream/government 
parties and issue entrepreneurs (Eurosceptic parties for which Europe is salient) 
3 
 
are very important factors determining the activity of national parliaments in 
EU affairs. The strategies impact both ‘resolutions’ adopted by the parliaments as 
well as ‘motions’ -  statements  of party groups which are not agreed upon by the 
parliaments. However, different strategic incentives and constraints of both 
mainstream parties and issue entrepreneurs make it unlikely that both motions 
and resolutions are used to actively control the government. Instead, they are 
more likely to be employed as instruments for position taking.  
 The activity of national parliaments in EU affairs is responsive to public 
opinion on the EU, to which different types of parties react in opposite ways. 
Government parties are responsible for the majority of successful resolutions. 
The resolutions initiated by these parties are generally very supportive of the 
government’s position and so cannot be regarded as ‘critical’ scrutiny. By 
contrast, issue entrepreneurs are a driving force with regard to the activity in 
the form of motions. ‘Issue entrepreneurs’ are parties that are far removed from 
the mainstream of the parliament on their EU position (Hobolt and De Vries, 
2015: 3). In particular, more motions are initiated by issue entrepreneurs if the 
public is Eurosceptic. This article also shows that motions initiated by issue 
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entrepreneurs generally have longer preambles and shorter operational parts, 
arguably indicating that these parties pay more attention to general political 
points instead of technical scrutiny.  
 The findings of the article thus show that political parties use resolutions 
in EU affairs rather as instruments for position taking than for scrutiny of the 
government. It might thus be necessary to rethink the extent to which national 
parliaments individually or collectively can increase democratic accountability 
in the European Union by controlling their governments.  
 
Resolutions and the Different Parliamentary Functions in EU Affairs  
 
In the last two decades, the role of national parliaments in EU affairs has 
received increased attention by practitioners and academics alike in the context 
of a perceived loss of power of national parliaments due to European 
integration which arguably could not be fully compensated by an increase in 
power of the European Parliament (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Moravcsik, 
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1994). To counteract this tendency, European Affairs Committees (EACs) have 
been established in all member states. 
For the most part, the academic literature has focused on compiling 
elaborate rankings of the formal powers of national parliaments (Maurer and 
Wessels, 2001; Karlas, 2011; Winzen, 2012) and on analysing the determinants of 
variation in these formal powers (Raunio, 2005; Winzen, 2013). Only rather 
recently has a literature emerged that focuses on the actual activity of national 
parliaments in the form of debates and resolutions (e.g. Auel and Raunio, 2014; 
Auel et al., 2015; Rauh, 2015; Wendler, 2014). 
Parliamentary activities in EU affairs broadly correspond to two 
categories of functions of parliaments (Raunio and De Wilde, 2015: 3). Based on 
the work of Packenham (1973), Norton divided the functions of parliament as 
citizen- and government-related (1993). Generally, the function of government 
control is seen as ‘scrutiny’ in the stricter sense and it is also this function that 
received the most scholarly attention (Raunio and De Wilde, 2015: 4). Of all 
forms of parliamentary activity in EU affairs, the literature sees resolutions as 
the clearest embodiment of ‘scrutiny’ in the sense of government control (Auel, 
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Rozenberg and Tacea, 2015: 291; Finke and Dannwolf, 2013: 739). Resolutions 
and motions are directed at the government and often have a rather technical 
language. By contrast, parliamentary debates and oral questions are usually 
seen as more related to the communication function given their higher public 
visibility to voters (Auel et al., 2015: 291; Raunio, 2011: 306).  
However I argue that one cannot expect that motions and resolutions are 
necessarily used for ‘scrutiny’ in the sense of government control given the 
strategic incentives and constraints faced by different types of parties in 
initiating them. Resolutions and motions are more likely to be used as 
instruments for position taking, as explained in the next section. Additional 
theoretical elaborations can be found in the Online appendix. 
 
 
Resolutions as Instruments for Position Taking 
 
Party political strategies are likely to determine the quantity and content 
of parliamentary activity in EU affairs and consequently the extent to which 
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national parliaments can help to foster democratic accountability in the EU. The 
most important distinction which can be made between different parties with 
regard to their strategies in EU affairs is the one between mainstream parties 
and issue entrepreneurs, which are faced with different incentives and 
constraints for becoming active. Overall, both motions and resolutions by issue 
entrepreneurs and government parties are more likely to be used as 
instruments for position taking rather than for government control. Issue 
entrepreneurs have a strong incentive to criticize the government’s policy and 
to relate it to a general criticism of the EU as such in the light of public 
Euroscepticism. By contrast, it is in the interest of government parties to defend 
the government’s position publicly without emphasizing technical detail. 
Parties which lose out in the political process are likely to introduce and 
champion new issues to change the dynamics of competition in the political 
system (Carmines and Stimson, 1986). In recent decades, the most important 
issues of this kind have been European integration and immigration (Van de 
Wardt et al., 2014: 987). Importantly, issue entrepreneurs have a larger ‘framing 
distance’ towards all other parties compared to mainstream parties (Van der 
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Wardt, 2015: 841). Their positions on the issue in question are therefore very 
different from the political mainstream. In the case of parliamentary 
engagement in EU affairs, this means that the chances of motions by issue 
entrepreneurs being accepted by parliament are very low since they are 
opposition parties without a realistic prospect of joining the government in the 
overwhelming majority of cases. 1 
 Therefore, it is likely that the objective of their motions is not to influence 
the government’s position and, indirectly, policy at the European level. Rather, 
issue entrepreneurs can be expected to draw attention to their particular 
position on a topic related to European Affairs. If they are more active on the 
topic of Europe, voters might come to regard them as more competent on the 
issue (Budge, 2015: 767). Moreover, issue entrepreneurs might want to expose – 
from their perspective – controversial or unpopular positions of the 
government on the matter, or to highlight and deepen divisions within 
mainstream parties by using Europe as a ‘wedge issue’ (Van de Wardt et al., 
2014: 986). Parties which adopt an issue entrepreneurial strategy have a lot of 
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electoral benefit from being perceived as active in EU affairs but face very little 
cost.  
Therefore, it is hypothesized that parties that are issue entrepreneurs 
initiate more motions on Europe. However, given that they are opposition 
parties, these motions are likely to be mostly unsuccessful. Because of their 
negative position on the EU, their motions are also likely to be very critical. The 
focus of these motions is rather to communicate the issue entrepreneur’s 
position to voters and to expose divisions within mainstream parties rather 
than actual government control. 
If parties do not care deeply about Europe or are generally 
accommodating of it but are faced with a Eurosceptic electorate, Members of 
Parliament (MPs) might not want to be perceived as active in EU affairs by 
issuing resolutions. This is because they face potentially high costs by investing 
time and resources in an issue on which they are likely to have a different 
position compared to their voters if the latter are Eurosceptic, given that elites 
tend to be more pro-European than citizens in most European countries 
(Hooghe, 2003: 296). Moreover, in contrast to issue entrepreneurs, mainstream 
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parties are frequently divided on EU affairs (Gabel and Scheve, 2007: 38). 
Hence, they have relatively little to gain from investing time and resources in 
European affairs with regard to electoral benefits, and run the risk of issue 
entrepreneurs exposing their dividedness on the issue or highlighting how the 
elite position is at odds with the preferences of the electorate. When mainstream 
parties do issue resolutions, their main purpose might be to show support for 
the government and to strengthen its negotiation position at the European level. 
These resolutions are generally very likely to be approved by parliament. 
Again, the main purpose of their resolutions is not scrutiny in the narrow sense 
of the term, but rather strategic support for the government and of 
communicating its position. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Parties that are issue entrepreneurs issue more resolutions on 
Europe than mainstream parties.  
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H1b: The resolutions initiated by issue entrepreneurs are on average 
more critical towards the government than the resolutions of mainstream 
parties.  
 
 The precise incentives and constraints of parties to become active in EU 
affairs are likely to be shaped by public opinion. Eurosceptic voters expect their 
agents to be more assertive. By contrast, when there is a permissive consensus 
in favour of the EU, MPs might have fewer incentives to invest their time and 
resources in scrutiny. This might also hold true for the number of resolutions 
issued per month. Moreover, it can be hypothesized that the resolutions tend to 
be more critical if the public is Eurosceptic.  
Public Euroscepticism is likely to influence the activity of both issue 
entrepreneurs and government parties. Research has demonstrated that parties’ 
positions on EU affairs are relevant to the choices of voters – there is ‘issue 
voting’ with regard to EU affairs even though it is conditional on the salience of 
the topic and the structure of partisan conflict (De Vries, 2007: 379). 
Governments react to public opinion both in the form of promises and actions 
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(Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2012: 323). When public Euroscepticism is strong, 
issue entrepreneurs are likely to become more active in EU affairs and initiate 
motions more frequently in order to show the electorate that they are in line 
with their more Eurosceptic preferences. On the other hand, government and 
mainstream parties are likely to issue fewer resolutions when faced with public 
Euroscepticism, since they overwhelmingly hold pro-European positions. 
 
H2a: Issue entrepreneurs initiate more resolutions on EU affairs if the 
public is Eurosceptic, while mainstream parties issue fewer resolutions.  
 
H2b: Parties issue more critical resolutions towards the government if the 
public is Eurosceptic. 
 
  With regard to the content of resolutions, it is hypothesized that issue 
entrepreneurs will focus more on general criticism of the European Union 
instead of actual scrutiny in the form of detailed policy suggestions. It is in their 
interest to focus more on these general points as they generate more public 
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attention. Moreover, these parties often might not have a well-developed 
platform on technical EU policies. As a proxy for the relationship between 
general statements and actual policy prescriptions, the ratio between the 
preamble and the operational part of motions and resolutions is employed, as 
explained in more technical detail in the Online appendix.  
 
H3: Resolutions initiated by issue entrepreneurs will have a lower ratio 
of the operational part to the preamble. 
 
Data and Method 
 
I have chosen the following countries as cases for the analysis: Austria, 
Germany, France, Spain and the UK. The ‘new’ member states which joined the 
EU in 2004 and 2007 were excluded given the fact that their scrutiny systems 
were still significantly in flux in the period of analysis. Likewise, the party 
systems in these countries have long been characterized by periods of 
instability and volatility (Bakke and Sitter, 2005). The exclusion of these 
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countries certainly limits the generalizability of the findings to some extent. 
Nevertheless, the countries analysed in this article represent an excellent 
institutional spread and a high variation regarding the key independent 
variables of the study, most notably public Euroscepticism and the existence of 
strong Eurosceptic parties.  
 In contrast to other parliamentary activities such as questions or debates, 
defining what constitutes a motion or a resolution is not straightforward. Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines a resolution as ‘The determination or decision, in regard 
to its opinion or intention, of a deliberative or legislative body (…)’ (Black’s 
Law Dictionary, 2014). The exact form a resolution takes differs between 
parliaments. However, generally they are the most direct and formal way in 
which parliament or a party group (or even a group of MPs) can express their 
opinion on an EU legal act and/or the government’s treatment of and position 
on the latter. While ‘resolutions’ are thus agreed on by parliaments, statements 
by party groups that did not gain majority support are referred to as ‘motions’ 
in this article.  
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 Which documents are counted as resolutions and motions is an 
important decision that has to be the result of careful consideration. For the 
purpose of this article, I include only instruments that are potentially binding, 
and had the potential to directly influence the position of the government. All 
resolutions and motions from the relevant categories have been collected for the 
time period studied here. 2 
 Three properties of parliamentary motions and resolutions in EU affairs 
are analysed in this article as dependent variables. As a first step, their quantity 
is examined, i.e. the number of resolutions according to the above definition in 
a given month. As a second step, the content or ‘quality’ of these statements is 
analysed. More specifically, the extent to which the resolutions are critical or 
supportive of the government is investigated. For this purpose, the motions and 
resolutions were hand-coded by two coders on a scale from -2 (very critical) to 2 
(very supportive).3 As a third step, the relative length of the preamble and the 
operational party a document is used as a proxy for how detailed the mandate 
is for the government is analysed. This measure was inspired by the work of 
Huber and Shipan who use the relative length of legal documents as a proxy for 
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the level of discretion a bureaucratic agent has in the implementation of 
legislation (Huber and Shipan, 2002: 73). 
As predictor variables, the issue entrepreneurship score of the parties 
was included. It is operationalized as following (Hobolt and De Vries, 2012: 
256): The difference of the mean party position on Europe of all parties in 
parliament and the party position of each respective party is multiplied by the 
EU salience score of each party. 4 The position and salience scores are taken 
from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Popular Euroscepticism is operationalized 
as the number of respondents stating their country’s membership to the 
European Union was ‘a bad thing’ minus those stating that it was ‘a good thing’ 
in the Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer, 2012).  
As control variables, the left/right position for all parties in parliament 
was included, as well as the extent to which parties are internally divided on 
Europe, also based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015). I also 
include the strength of formal scrutiny powers based on Winzen (2012) and 
whether a country held the Council presidency in a given month Moreover, I 
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control for the seat share of a party as a proxy for the resources it can apply to 
drafting and issuing resolutions.  
Missing values were filled in using linear interpolation. There are overall 
3641 non-missing month/party observations for 1977 individual 
motions/resolutions covering the time period the mid/late 1990s until 2012. 
Resolutions are frequently sponsored jointly by more than one party. In these 
cases, I count the resolutions separately for each party. Descriptive statistics can 
be found in Table A2 in the Online appendix. 
 
 
Results and Analysis  
 
The unit of analysis for the quantity of resolutions is the number of 
resolutions per party per month. A multilevel count model was applied to 
assess the overall number of resolutions by month (Models 1, 3 and 5). A 
negative binominal model was chosen over a Poisson model since the overall 
variance of the resolutions is significantly larger than their mean (Rabe-Hesketh 
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and Skrondal, 2012: 696). In order to analyse the valence of the resolutions, the 
mean of the valence scores for all resolutions issued in one month was used as 
the dependent variable for a multilevel linear regression (Models 2, 4 and 6). To 
account for autocorrelation, I include a lagged dependent variable in all models 
(Becks and Katz, 1995) as well as a monthly time trend variable. All models in 
this article use random intercepts for the different countries and parties, but the 
results also hold for fixed effects models (see the Online appendix for this 
specification and additional robustness checks). Table 1 shows the results of the 
analysis. 
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
  When analysing unsuccessful motions and successful resolutions 
together, it becomes clear that issue entrepreneurs are indeed prone to more 
activity in the form of resolutions, as the results of Model 1 show. The 
coefficient for the effect of issue entrepreneurship score on the number of 
resolutions is significant at the 0.01 level and in the expected direction (0.15), 
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confirming Hypothesis 1a. Substantially, on average an opposition party with a 
very high issue entrepreneurship score of ten (such as the Austrian Freedom 
Party) initiates 2.3 resolutions per month, compared to 0.27 resolutions for a 
mainstream opposition party with an issue entrepreneurship score of -4 (for 
example, the French Parti Socialiste) at an Euroscepticism score of 0. 
  The average monthly valence of all resolutions issued by a party in a 
given month decreases by 4% for a one-unit increase on the issue 
entrepreneurship score (Model 2). Resolutions initiated by issue entrepreneurs 
are thus more critical than those initiated by pro-European parties, confirming 
Hypothesis 1b. Not surprisingly, government participation has the opposite 
effect. On average, the monthly valence of all resolutions initiated by a 
governing party in a given month is 1.33 points higher than for an opposition 
party. The formal powers of a parliament seem to have a positive effect on the 
number of resolutions being issued, as does the seat share of a party.  
  An interesting interaction effect with the issue entrepreneurship score of 
a party and public Euroscepticism can be observed, confirming Hypothesis 2a. 
When the issue entrepreneurship score of a party is high, Euroscepticism seems 
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to have an increasingly positive effect on the number of resolutions, i.e. the 
higher the issue entrepreneurship score of a party, the more resolutions will be 
issued when the public is Eurosceptic. As shown in Figure 1, for parties with a 
low issue entrepreneurship score (i.e. parties that are pro-European and for 
which the EU is not a salient topic) an increase in public Euroscepticism is 
associated with fewer motions on EU affairs being issued. Thus, for a party 
with an issue entrepreneurship score of -4 (e.g. the Parti Socialiste) a one-unit 
increase in public Euroscepticism is associated with approximately 1.5 
resolution less being issued per month. By contrast, for a party with a high 
issue entrepreneurship score of 10 (such as the FPO), an increase in public 
Euroscepticism is associated with 4 additional resolutions for a one-unit 
increase in public Euroscepticism. MPs might want to signal to their 
Eurosceptic voters that they take the task of scrutinizing the government on EU 
affairs seriously.  
 
[FIGURE 1] 
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 As explained above, it is important to distinguish between those 
resolutions which were actually agreed on by parliament and those which were 
initiated by a party group but not actually adopted (‘motions’). When only 
analysing the resolutions that parliament agreed on it becomes clear that public 
Euroscepticism is associated with fewer resolutions being issued. However, the 
issue entrepreneurship score of a party and its interaction with public 
Euroscepticism does not have a significant effect (Model 3, Figure 2). By 
contrast, the government status of a party seems to have a significant and 
positive effect on the number of resolutions, as does their share of seats in the 
legislature. On average, a government party issues around three times more 
resolutions per month than an opposition party. It becomes clear that for the 
number of resolutions actually agreed on by parliament, the government status 
of a party is the most important determinant. Large government parties with a 
high seat share tend to issue more successful resolutions, most likely given their 
more extensive resources.  
 
[FIGURE 2] 
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It is interesting to note that successful resolutions are significantly more 
positive if a country has the Council Presidency – potentially, parties 
supporting the government want to strengthen its position and priorities 
during this time (Model 4). Moreover, the formal powers of a parliament seem 
to play a role in influencing the valence of successful resolutions. Parties in 
parliaments with stronger formal powers tend to issue resolutions that are more 
supportive of the government. A potential explanation for this could be that 
strong coordination processes behind closed doors mean that lines of conflict 
are resolved before they become public. Alternatively, strong scrutiny powers 
could lead the government to anticipates potential criticism by the parliament 
more seriously, so that it received more positive resolutions from the party 
groups 
A different picture emerges when analysing only the motions that were 
not successful in the legislature. As Model 5 shows, the coefficient for the issue 
entrepreneurship score is significant (0.14) and positive at the 0.01 level. The 
effect for government participation is negative, whereas the effect for the formal 
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powers of parliaments is positive. Again, an interaction effect with public 
Euroscepticism can be observed, confirming Hypothesis 2a. As for the 
substantive effect sizes, for a party with an issue entrepreneurship score of -4 
(Parti Socialiste), a one-unit increase in Euroscepticism is associated with 
around 1 resolution less per month being issued, while it is associated with an 
increase of approximately 2 resolutions for a party with an issue 
entrepreneurship score of around 10, such as the FPO (Figure 3). It becomes 
clear that government parties issue significantly fewer unsuccessful motions. 
Strong formal powers and holding the Council Presidency are also associated 
with a larger number of motions being issued.  
 
[FIGURE 3] 
 
 For unsuccessful resolutions, the issue entrepreneurship score of a party 
has a small but significant impact on the average monthly valence: a one unit 
increase on the issue entrepreneurship score leads is associated with a decrease 
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in the average monthly valence of 3% (Model 6). As in Model 2, the coefficient 
is positive for government status.  
 Finally, the extent to which the ratio of the preamble to the main 
operational part of a motion differs between parties was analysed (Model 7). 
The log-transformed ratio of the length of the preamble of a motion and its 
operational part is specified as the dependent variable for a multilevel linear 
regression. Issue entrepreneurs initiate motions with longer preambles and 
shorter operational parts – potentially because they bring up more general, 
politicized points that are usually placed in the preamble and they are less 
concerned with actual ‘technical’ scrutiny, which takes place in the operational 
part. A one-unit increase in the issue entrepreneurship score is associated with 
the ratio of preamble and operational part to being 5 % smaller for unsuccessful 
motions, confirming Hypothesis 3. Examples of motions by issue entrepreneurs 
and mainstream parties that demonstrate the different structures of the 
documents are reproduced in the Online appendix together with additional 
elaborations.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 This article suggests that the use of resolutions and motions by national 
parliaments in EU affairs is complex and overall not focused on the actual 
control of the government. Rather, resolutions and motions can rather be seen 
as instruments for position taking. The presence of issue entrepreneurs and, 
generally, the position of parties on European integration play an important 
role in determining parliamentary activity.  
However, there is a significant difference between resolutions agreed 
upon by parliament and motions that did not gain majority support. The 
successful resolutions are initiated by large government parties in the vast 
majority of cases. By contrast, when analysing the motions which failed to reach 
a majority in parliament separately, it became clear that issue entrepreneur 
parties are overwhelmingly responsible for these documents. Issue 
entrepreneurs are generally very critical of the government’s position. 
Moreover, interaction effects between the presence of issue entrepreneurs and 
public Euroscepticism can be observed. For issue entrepreneurs, public 
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Euroscepticism leads to more resolutions being initiated, while the opposite is 
the case for mainstream parties. 
However, as the analysis of their structure and content shows, motions 
initiated by issue entrepreneurs are mostly concerned with general, politicized 
and Eurosceptic statements. The operational parts of the documents are mostly 
short and contain little detail. Therefore, it might be argued that there is little 
substantive scrutiny, i.e. parliaments might fail to make an impact on the ‘bread 
and butter’ issues of EU politics which they could otherwise influence. 
It seems that motions and resolutions are actually rather used as 
instruments of position taking – supporting the government in the case of 
government parties, criticising the government in the case of issue 
entrepreneurs – rather than a form of actual government control, which was 
what they are intended for. This might limit the extent to which the activity of 
national parliaments can increase democratic accountability in the European 
Union. However, they still have the potential to draw citizens’ attention to EU 
issues and make them aware of government policy.  
27 
 
 As mentioned above, the patterns of resolutions in domestic affairs 
might be different given the more complex strategic situation opposition and 
government parties are faced with in a multilevel system, as well as the 
respective issue dynamics in different policy areas. Future studies could thus 
compare resolutions in European and domestic matters as well as in different 
issue areas.  
 
 
 
Notes 
                                                     
1. The cases of BZO and FPO as exceptions to this rule are discussed in more detail on 
pp. 11-12 of  the Online appendix (Figures A1 and A2). 
2. See Table A1 on p. 1 of the Online appendix  for the different instruments and the 
criteria for selecting them. 
3. The inter-coder reliability score Krippendorff’s α  reaches 0.687 when a five category 
Lickert-type scale is used. When the scale is collapsed to three categories from -1 to 1, α 
reaches 0.910. The Online appendix contains more details on the coding scheme (pp. 4-
6). 
4. See pp. 7-8 of the Online appendix for more details on the operationalization of the 
IVs.  
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Tables and Figures  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Marginal Effect of Euroscepticism on the Number of all Resolutions 
depending on the Issue Entrepreneurship Score.  
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Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Euroscepticism on the Number of Successful 
Resolutions depending on the Issue Entrepreneurship Score. 
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Figure 3. Marginal Effect of Euroscepticism on the Number of Unsuccessful 
Motions) depending on the Issue Entrepreneurship Score. 
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Table 1. Results of the Regression Analysis  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 All Sentiment 
All 
Successful Sentiment 
Successful 
Unsuccessful Sentiment 
Unsuccessful 
Ratio  
        
Issue Entrepreneur 0.15*** -0.04** 0.04 -0.00 0.14*** -0.03** -0.05*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
Internal Dissent -0.01 -0.07 -0.17 -0.01 0.16* -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.15) (0.06) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) 
Left Right -
0.06*** 
-0.06* -0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Formal Rights 0.87*** 0.39** 0.59 1.67*** 0.94** 0.18 0.35* 
 (0.32) (0.18) (0.45) (0.20) (0.39) (0.1 7) (0.21) 
Government -0.13 1.33*** 1.06*** -0.06 -1.46*** 0.40*** -0.10 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.17) (0.20) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) 
Presidency 0.05 -0.13 -1.02*** 1.77*** 0.36** 0.11 0.27* 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.27) (0.55) (0.14) (0.09) (0.16) 
Seat Share 0.99*** 0.98* 2.99*** 0.55 0.40 0.32 0.04 
 (0.36) (0.50) (0.83) (0.44) (0.42) (0.36) (0.30) 
Euroscepticism -0.16 0.40 -2.66* -0.47 0.19 0.06 0.37 
 (0.91) (0.40) (1.57) (0.42) (1.05) (0.32) (0.47) 
Euroscepticism x Issue 
Entrepreneur 
0.58***  0.11  0.58***   
 (0.10)  (0.23)  (0.12)   
Euroscepticism x Internal Dissent -0.05  0.23  -0.15   
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 (0.24)  (0.41)  (0.27)   
Month 0.00*** -0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lag All 0.14***       
 (0.03)       
Lag Sentiment All  0.22***      
  (0.05)      
Lag Successful   0.13***     
   (0.05)     
Lag Sentiment Successful    -0.01    
    (0.06)    
Lag Unsuccessful     0.10**   
     (0.04)   
Lag Sentiment Unsuccessful      0.50***  
      (0.06)  
Lag Ratio        0.03 
       (0.04) 
Constant -
4.76*** 
-0.76 -8.01*** -2.32*** -5.24*** -0.46 -0.63 
 (0.66) (0.59) (1.03) (0.87) (0.81) (0.48) (0.64) 
Observations 3611 435 3611 158 3611 234 572 
Countries 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 
Parties 26 20 26 14 26 14 16 
Note: Models 1, 3 and 5 multilevel negative binominal regression. Models 2, 4, 6 and 7: multilevel linear regression. Random 
intercepts for countries and parties. ***p< 0.01,**p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. 
